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Ordered Liberty
and the Homeland
Security Mission
By Judge James E. Baker
6 WINTER 2003
he last issue of this magazine included my stump
speech on "The Constitutional Duty of a National
Security Lawyer."' The keynote headers can be
summarized as follows:
"As a result of September 11, we have experienced
what Harold Lasswell referred to as the "socializa-
tion of danger," the sharing throughout society of
the physical risk of war.2 This is something new for
America. As a result, we must reconsider the mean-
ing of national security.
" National security means not only physical security,
but also preserving our way of life, which means a
society based on the rule of law.
" National security lawyers, to include military
lawyers, contribute to our physical security and our
way of life. As a consequence, this is an important
time to be a lawyer, for so much of who we are, and
how we will provide for our security, is the product
of law, and foremost the Constitution.
" Military lawyers appreciate this better than most,
because they swear an oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and not to a person or a political or
military regime. This is an essential part of the U.S.
military's code of honor and a principle reason that
the U.S. military is the finest in the world.
I was subsequently asked to take this discussion a step
further in the context of homeland security.3
I will start with a brief discussion of the threat
because the threat of terrorism remains the predicate for
any serious discussion of where we draw our legal lines.
I will then suggest a legal model for looking at questions
of homeland security called ordered liberty. The model
is simple. First, given the nature of the threat, the execu-
tive must have broad and flexible authority to detect and
respond to terrorism - to provide for our physical securi-
ty. Second, the sine qua non for such authority is mean-
ingful oversight. By oversight, I mean the considered
application of constitutional structure, executive process,
legal substance, and relevant review to decision-making
- all of which depend on the integrity and judgment of
government lawyers.
Meaningful oversight protects our way of life. It
also protects our security by helping decision-makers
get it right on the front end of a decision, rather than
investigating on the back end. This model does not
detail whether civil service rules should apply to the
Homeland Security Department, or whether military
commissions are a good idea. However, my comments
will suggest some principles and lessons learned that
can be applied to such questions. In the process, I also
hope to debunk two false dichotomies: first, that secu-
rity and liberty conflict; and, second that oversight and
security conflict.
I. The Threat of Terrorism
Let me start with some common footing regarding
the threat of terrorism. The threat is real. It is lasting.
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It is potentially devastating. And, it
is local. Judith Miller captured all of
this in her book, Germs, in asking:
"Is the threat of germ weapons real
or exaggerated? In most conditions,
a five-pound bag of anthrax could
kill many people, but not as many
as half the inhabitants of
Washington, D.C." 4
As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
and others have said, the margin
for error is small. If this were not
the case, the United States would
not have launched a controversial
missile strike on the Al-Shifa plant
in Sudan to prevent the possibility
of Al-Queda acquiring chemical
weapons. And there would be no
need to carefully consider how we
maintain liberty and security in a
democracy. Understanding the
threat, I think it is clear that while
any specific grant or assertion of
authority may be ill-founded, as a
general matter, executive actors
need broad and flexible authority to
address terrorism.
First, speed is critical in the
Weapons of Mass Destruction arena.
The Dark Winter exercise' (and many
since) demonstrated that if you do
not respond immediately to a biologi-
cal warfare attack, a disease may
spread within hours beyond the per-
ceived contamination zone, nullifying
any possibility of a limited ring quar-
antine. Second, we can learn the
threat and apply the lessons of
September 11, and we still may not
foresee or prevent the next attack, nor
identify every legal need in defend-
ing our open and global society.
Finally, the threat is seamless.
Traditional Cold War distinctions
between domestic and foreign
authority in the intelligence area, for
example, may prove dysfunctional
when the enemy is in both locations,
targeting both locations, and can
move from one to the other. In
short, if the threat is seamless,
authority and lines of responsibility
cannot begin and stop at the water's
edge, or require a change in sub-
stantive legal gauge. Therefore,
absent naked assertions of
Constitutional authority, the legisla-
ture and executive must provide
and define the authority to act in
advance.
It is a principle of democratic the-
ory (and a reality) that there is more
risk of error (and abuse) with broad
authority than with narrow authori-
ty. As a student of government and
a participant in democracy, I would
prefer that my government act with
narrow authority. But I also would
prefer that today was September 10,
2001. As a student of national secu-
rity, I have no doubt that broad
authority and flexibility are essential
to fight this battle and that much of
the battle will be fought here in
America.
This leads to what I call False
Dichotomy Number One: An
increase in security must result in a
decrease in liberty and vice versa.
This is an argument you find on
both sides of homeland security
debates. On a macro level, it may
be useful to consider that in
wartime the relationship between
security and liberty might be differ-
ent, as Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Breyer have recently suggest-
ed. 6 But in a conflict without fore-
seeable end and without recognized
boundaries, this is just the begin-
and liberty. It is between liberty
with order and anarchy without
either."9 In my view, to maintain
order, we must work back from the
threat and provide broad authority.
To provide for liberty with order, we
must have meaningful oversight.
II. Oversight and National
Security
This leads to False Dichotomy
Number Two: Oversight impedes
timely national security decision-mak-
ing. Here I am talking about over-
sight as the process and substantive
framework of decision. I am not talk-
ing about the sort of "oversight" that
evokes images of show hearings and
political theater, although sometimes
that can be an important part of the
democratic process.
Oversight is an essential compo-
nent of national security decision-
making itself. The right guidelines,
the right measure of review, and the
right measure of process result in bet-
ter decisions. Oversight means think-
Executive actors need broad
and flexible authority to
address terrorism.
ning of the conversation in a consti-
tutional democracy.
People are fond of quoting Justice
Jackson's statement, later repeated
by Justice Goldberg, that the consti-
tutional Bill of Rights is not a sui-
cide pact.7 (I might add that most
do so without the context of the full
quote: "There is danger that, if the
Court does not temper its doctri-
naire logic with a little practical wis-
dom, it will convert the constitu-
tional Bill of Rights into a suicide
pact."'). Surely you cannot have lib-
erty without security. But that is a
truism that does not tell you much
about how to address the two in
any given context. I think Jackson's
full dissent tells us a great deal
more about the analysis we should
apply today than the phrase about
suicide pacts. His argument is cap-
tured in the following sentences:
"The choice is not between order
ing through what you are doing
before you do it, if only for a moment,
if a moment is all you have. Process
ensures that multiple viewpoints are
heard and that multiple sources of
facts are considered. It allows deci-
sion-makers to better allocate finite
resources. And, all of these factors
help to sustain long-term public sup-
port for a long-term conflict.
Judge James E. Baker
serves on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces. He is a former
Special Assistant to the President and Legal
Adviser to the National Security Council (NSC),
where he advised the President, the National
Security Advisor and the NSC staff on U.S. and
international law involving national security,
including use of force, the law of armed con-
flict, intelligence activities, foreign assistance,
terrorism, arms control, human rights, and
international law enforcement.
THE PUBLIC LAWYER WINTER 2003 ~/
THE PUBLIC LAWYER WINTER 2003
A. Constitutional Oversight
Oversight starts with the
Constitution, which has two funda-
mental structural checks on the
exercise of executive power: a feder-
al system of divided authority
between national and state actors
and a framework of separate and
shared powers between co-equal
branches of national government.
Federalism is a new prism for
national security lawyers raised in a
Cold War climate of national and
executive authority. But homeland
security, with its emphasis on first
responders and local detection,
requires vertical organization from
federal to local government, and not
just horizontal organization within
the national government. This
implicates Article IV and the 1 0 th
Amendment, which reserves to the
states those powers not "delegated
to the United States." Foremost,
this means the police power, the
residual power of states to protect
the public welfare. Thus, finding
the right balance between federal
and local exercise of authority is
petitive constitutional forces of the
political branches. It was a some-
times crushing, sometimes frustrat-
ing, but always a wonderful feeling.
Wonderful, because it gave me a
deeper faith in the Constitution as a
functional instrument of democratic
government. I saw it work on a daily
basis in the interchange between
branches, notwithstanding the efforts
of some in both political branches to
win. Tensions between the branches
should not hide this pivotal truth.
The exercise of separate, but shared
powers is a source of homeland
strength not weakness.
Why do I say that? First, the par-
ticipation of each branch in the deci-
sion-making process is a source of
authority. We can debate the ulti-
mate breadth of the President's
authority, but what we cannot debate
is that where the President acts con-
sistent with congressional authoriza-
tion "his authority is at its maxi-
mum." 10 Second, the exercise of
Constitutional oversight results in a
better product. Certainly, if that exer-
cise occurs at the wrong time or in
The more enduring source of
ordered liberty must be found
in the separation of powers.
both a matter of efficacy and a mat-
ter of Constitutional design.
Nonetheless, because defense of the
homeland is arguably the central
Constitutional responsibility, the
authority of the United States, read
with the supremacy clause (and
doctrine of preemption), will ulti-
mately eclipse principles of federal-
ism. Therefore, the more enduring
source of ordered liberty must be
found in the separation of powers.
With the Constitution, everything
flows from the structure of checks
and balances found in the first three
Articles. There are inherent and
necessary tensions between the
branches. As the National Security
Council (NSC) Legal Adviser, I felt
like a ball bearing between the com-
the wrong manner, that might not be
the case. But there is no question in
my mind that the Congress and the
judiciary play an important role in
testing and validating the actions of
the executive branch to ensure not
only that they are legal, but that they
are working. The function is all the
more important in an area of policy
where much is necessarily secret, and
thus the press and the public are not
in the same position to perform this
validating role essential to success
and democracy. Finally, the participa-
tion of all three branches of national
government is a source of legitimacy:
democratic legitimacy in the case of
the Congress, and constitutional
legitimacy in the case of the judiciary.
This is critical in a conflict with
uncertain parameters where public
support must be sustained over
years.
B. Substantive
Whether contained in a statute or
directive, substantive thresholds, if
they do not expressly bar an action,
define the parameters of action. For
example, the USA PATRIOT Act
changed the substantive threshold
for obtaining a FISA" warrant (as
opposed to a Title III criminal search
warrant) requiring certification that
"a significant purpose" of the search
rather than "the purpose" of the
search is to collect foreign intelli-
gence information.12 By further
example, the National Security Act
defines covert action by what it is,
an action intended to influence
events abroad without the U.S. hand
apparent or acknowledged, and by
what it is not, certain "traditional"
military, diplomatic, and law
enforcement activities. 3 Where
these thresholds are met, particular
statutory and executive processes
are engaged.
The flip side of this analysis is that
standards do not always provide the
measure of oversight anticipated.
Some standards become so malleable
as to become almost meaningless.
For example, the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) requires a presidential decla-
ration of national emergency finding
an "unusual and extraordinary
threat" to the "national security, for-
eign policy, or economy of the United
States."' 4 This would seem a high
substantive threshold. However,
while IEEPA was used to address
emergencies like the taking of
hostages in Iran, it has also been used
to suspend the importation of
Krugerands into the United States.
One of my last IEEPA debates at the
NSC was over whether a dead man
presented an "unusual and extraordi-
nary threat" to the United States.
That is just taking the argument too
far. Ordered liberty requires some-
thing more than substantive thresh-
olds as oversight.
C. Process
Oversight means good process,
which should be both prospective
and retrospective. Prospective over-
sight includes policy review and the
review of individual actions, what
THE PUBLIC LAWYERWINTER 2003
John Hamre, the President of the
Center for Strategic and
International Studies, calls transac-
tional oversight. Good process
establishes accountability, which in
turn improves result.
Retrospective oversight should
do the same. With respect to indi-
vidual actions, we should periodi-
cally ask whether this is an activity
that should continue? Does the
legal predicate still apply? With
respect to guidelines, should we
question whether they work as
intended? Do they constrain as a
matter of culture or as a matter of
law? Often, complaints about
guidelines only come out when
there is a problem and actors are
looking to shift responsibility.
Oversight should include the con-
stant reconsideration and adjust-
ment of the rules of engagement.
Similarly, it is easier to start
something in the government than
to turn it off. With national security,
the great weight of pressure leans
toward continuing an action,
because the consequences of stop-
ping and being wrong can be devas-
tating. But good process, particular-
ly where U.S. personnel may be
involved, includes active review so
that finite resources can be shifted
to real threats.
There are three complaints about
process: first, it takes time; second, it
risks operational disclosure; and,
third, someone might disagree. My
answer to the first two complaints
is: Make it work; it is worth the
effort. If speed is essential, convene
the key actors in the Oval Office,
and process will be as immediate as
the President's decision.
Secrecy is always a matter of bal-
ance. Too small a circle risks the
omission of key input or "group
think." Too large a circle and a
would-be leaker may find cover and
concealment.
My answer to the third complaint
is the President. Disagreement does
not equal delay if decision-makers
are willing to forward issues to the
President, which if one adopts the
nuclear model, we know can be
done in minutes if we must.
D. Human Factor
Good government ultimately
depends on good people. More
than anything else, ordered liberty
requires courage and integrity from
those who wield the authority of
law or interpret law. Why? Because
ultimately, any process or substan-
tive standard is effective only
because a person has triggered the
process or applied the standard in
good faith.
What prevents an Iran-Contra at
the NSC is not the presence of a
legal adviser, but the presence of a
national security advisor who insists
on meaningful legal review. Warren
Buffet said it slightly differently in
response to the rash of recent finan-
cial crimes. "To clean up their acts
... CEOs don't need 'independent'
directors, oversight committees or
auditors .... They simply need to
do what's right."15
Ill. Ordered Liberty and the
Culture of Law
Government and military
lawyers are an essential link to
ordered liberty. They help policy-
makers do what is right. They alone
may be sufficiently detached from
the policy outcome to objectively
identify the enduring consequences
of decisions. They have as their sole
duty the consideration and applica-
tion of law to the national security
mission. The rule of law can be par-
ticularly hard to express when
national security is invoked, and no
more so than when lives are at risk.
It is intuitive, but I cannot exag-
gerate the extent to which policy-
makers - Presidents - define their
success or failure as national-securi-
ty Presidents by whether American
lives are lost on their watch. The
pressure is palpable in a principals'
meeting or in the Oval Office. Mind
you, this is an observation, not a cri-
tique. Presidents have no more
important responsibility than pro-
tecting Americans.
All these pressures are at play
and at a deafening volume in the
area of homeland security. This
should inform the way we lawyer.
-Here are some brief lessons I
learned, and hopefully applied,
along the way.
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Good government ultimately
depends on good people.
Fifth Annual Spring Dispute
Resolution Conference
"Insight for Inspired Practice," San Antonio, TX, March 20-
22, 2003.
" The Fourteenth Annual Frank E. A. Sander Lecture
" Plenary address by Kenneth Feinberg, the Special Master
of the Sept. 11 Victim Compensation Fund
- Dispute resolution skills training by the nation's leading
trainers and practitioners
* Over 120 presentations covering the diverse world of dis-
pute resolution
* The Second Mini-Conference on Court ADR for neutrals,
judges, program administrators and more.
Visit www.abanet.org/dispute for more information.
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1. Participate. Ordered liberty in
a constitutional democracy means
that decisions are made in accor-
dance with law, and that requires
legal review. Invocation of national
security does not mean "lawyers
step aside;" rather, it is an invitation
to work quickly and well. That
means get in the loop -- no small
task when you are asking to attend
a principals' meeting of seven or a
general's planning cell. It also
means having the courage to partici-
pate with incomplete information
and incomplete law.
2. Do not create reasons to
bypass the law. Meet deadlines.
Get to the point. When you are
debating a particular target, the
client does not have time for a lec-
ture on Grotius. 16 Find the applica-
ble principles of law and apply
them. This also means front-load
work. We all can rattle off a reason-
able summary of the Posse
Comitatus Act. 17 But who is confi-
dent that they can advise a policy-
maker now, this minute, on the vari-
ous exceptions to the Act and the
substantive and procedural thresh-
olds for applying them. That is a
question every military lawyer any-
where in the United States must be
able to answer on the spot, where
the threat is national in scope, local
in effect, and catastrophic in result.
If you cannot answer the question,
or you must get your answer
approved in Washington, people
may die during the delay.
3. Engage in real law. Smart
lawyers can always craft an argu-
ment as to why their client can do
something. But if you honor the
rule of law, you should tell your
client not only that they can do
something, but the best way to do it
- in our context, the way that
accomplishes the mission and
upholds ordered liberty. Saying that
the Constitution is not a suicide pact
is not legal analysis. Recognizing
the legitimate role of oversight in a
constitutional system is real law.
Never lose sight of the real enemy -
it is not constitutional democracy or
those that help to articulate what
that means.
4. Look over the horizon.
Looking over the horizon means
avoiding the rocks and shoals of
past experience. Henry Kissinger
correctly observed that many
national security decisions are 51-49
affairs and might only look other-
wise with hindsight. 8 Hindsight is
20-20, but there are decisions that
should never be made that if sub-
jected to the sort of oversight that I
have described would have been
seen as 80-20s or even worse at the
time. While people may disagree on
the 1960s predicates for opening
mail or listening to telephones, there
certainly came a point when much
of this activity should have stopped
absent a showing of actual security
harm or threat. Perceptions of the
past color perspectives on the pres-
ent, but we must look forward with
clear vision. We cannot avoid the
51-49 decisions, but with meaning-
ful oversight, we can avoid the deci-
sions which should never be made
or no longer warrant approval.
Looking over the horizon also
means figuring out where the law
should go. For military lawyers,
there is no more important horizon
than that which defines the mili-
tary's role in homeland security.
The Boston Globe recently described
this as "the next big debate in
American society [that] is going to
be one of the most unsettling
debates of our time." 9 But we have
already crossed the line of depar-
ture.
The President's report on home-
land security describes three mili-
tary homeland missions. "In
extraordinary circumstances, the
Department [of Defense (DoD)]
would conduct military missions
such as combat air patrols or mar-
itime defense operations. ' 2° DoD
would also be involved "during
emergencies such as responding to
an attack or to forest fires, floods,
tornadoes, or other catastrophes." 2
"In these circumstances, the
Department may be asked to act
quickly to provide capabilities that
other agencies do not have." Lastly,
DoD would be involved "in 'limited
scope' missions where other agen-
cies would have the lead - for
example, security at a special event
like the recent Olympics. 22
As importantly, putting aside
constitutional arguments, there
already exist numerous exceptions
to the Posse Comitatus Act, which
together form a coherent framework
for military participation in home-
land defense. What are missing are
an awareness of this framework and
(happily) the repetitive knowledge
of experience. There are legitimate
concerns about losing public sup-
port and resource limitations if the
military plays too central a domestic
role in homeland defense. But this
is not Vietnam. This is America.
And there is no more important
national security mission than pro-
tecting America from attack. In
light of the threat, we cannot afford
anything other than our best
response, and in some areas, that
may mean a military response.
Therefore, we need to move beyond
threshold issues as to whether the
military should be used for home-
land defense and address the man-
ner of use and the measure of over-
sight.
What is the difference between an
"extraordinary circumstance" as
used in the President's report on
homeland security, and the every-
day extraordinary circumstance of
homeland security? Who will
decide and subject to what process
and substantive thresholds? Who
will oversee this process? Who will
validate the exercise of military
authority? And will the military act
with the full authority that comes
from the participation of all three
branches of government?
IV. Conclusion
Homeland security is not an issue
that one is for or against. It is a
matter of now and how, and on that
we can all agree. What we will not
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Looking over the horizon
means avoiding the rocks
and shoals of past experience.
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necessarily agree on is where to
draw each and every legal line.
While I have not sought to provide
specific answers, I have sought to
describe a framework for looking at
homeland security - called ordered
liberty - that addresses democracy's
desire for both security and liberty.
Now more than ever, we are
asked to, and must have faith in,
our government - federal, state,
and local. One source of faith is an
effective and democratic system of
oversight. Designed well, oversight
is not a bad word, but a source of
security strength. Oversight ensures
that broad authority is available to
an executive who may have only
moments to act. Oversight ensures
that authority is exercised in the
manner intended, with the result
intended, and for the period intend-
ed. Oversight is also a source of
legitimacy, which in a long fight is
essential.
Another source of faith is found
in a culture of law that celebrates
public service, national security, and
the Constitution. My faith in gov-
ernment comes in part because I
have served in the Marines and at
the NSC. I know that the best gov-
ernment and military lawyers not
only know how to argue, but also
know how to argue what is right.
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